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Abstract: Teleological language refers to a forward-looking discourse, and var-
ious biologists are troubled with this issue. In this paper, I will discuss the mis-
understandings that both philosophers of science and biologists have made 
against teleology. Among these misunderstandings, I can mention its relation-
ship to anthropomorphism (i.e., a planning agent external to the world refer-
ence) and reference to a force immanent to the organisms (“vitalism”) beyond 
the reach of empirical investigation. I will argue that they are misconceptions 
and that teleology has shifted its meaning and focus from its pre-evolutionary 
form. Now it is in the position that it can be used and maintained without vio-
lating the principles of modern science. Using an example of the adaptation and 
function debate, I will discuss how the teleological language is the best interpre-
tation of these issues.  
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Teleologia e Biologia: uma defesa do pensamento teleológico         
na biologia 
Resumo: A linguagem teleológica pode ser definida como um discurso pros-
pectivo, e isto tem preocupado biólogos em torno desse problema. Neste artigo, 
discutirei os mal-entendidos que filósofos da ciência e biólogos tiveram acerca 
da teleologia. Por exemplo, afirmam que a teleologia sofre de antropomorfismo 
(isto é, um agente de planejamento externo à referência mundial) e se refere a 
uma força imanente aos organismos (forças vitais ou “vitalismo”) além do al-
cance da investigação empírica. Argumentarei que eles estão equivocados e que 
a teleologia mudou seu significado e foco de sua forma pré-evolutiva, e agora 
pode ser usada e mantida sem violar os princípios da ciência moderna. Usando 
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como exemplo o debate sobre adaptação e função, discutirei como a linguagem 
teleológica é a melhor interpretação para essas questões. 
Palavras-chave: adaptação; biologia evolutiva; filosofia da ciência; teleologia 
1  TELEOLOGY AND BIOLOGY: A MISGUIDED BEGINNING 
I will start with the following quotation “Perhaps no other ideology 
has influenced biology more profoundly than teleological thinking.” 
(Mayr, 1992, p. 117). Indeed, mainly more recently, this influence was 
considered a negative one, a metaphysical reminiscent of the period be-
fore Darwin.  
Michael Ghiselin wrote: “As a result of my work on Darwin, I real-
ized that teleological thinking was still exercising a pernicious influence 
[…]”. (Guiselin, 1994, p. 489). Guiselin goes further in his attack against 
teleology by bringing this discussion to the mythological level: “The no-
tion that Darwin somehow got teleological thinking back into biology is 
a myth.” Ghiselin, 1994, p. 489).  However, as we will argue, this is far 
from reality.  
First, the “anthropomorphism” indicated earlier, is a chimaera of 
Greek thoughts: the Platonic and Aristotelian. The burden of the Pla-
tonic model is evident here, as, according to James J. Lennox (1992), this 
thinking explicitly treats the natural world as the production of a divine 
figure, and the physical universe as the result of a rational agent. How-
ever, matters are quite different when we consider Aristotle’s approach 
to teleology.  
The reading of Lennox (1992) shows that the Aristotelian thinking in 
teleology is close the modern biological explanations. So, for Aristotle, 
scientific understanding is achieved when somebody can correctly an-
swer the question “Why?”. Such an answer involves the identification of 
its causes. One knows that for the explanation of a fact, there may be 
several different answers, reflecting different causes. The following 
quote can explain it: ‘‘Except for the organism’s form [...] none of the 
parts that contribute to the organism’s life would come to be or exist’’ 
(Aristotle, apud, Short, 2002, p. 326) 
Lennox concludes that for Aristotle the action of a rational agent is 
unnecessary, while this is not the case for Plato. Now we can see that 
this charge is misguided. Plato’s teleology recurred to a supernatural or 
divine interpretation, while Aristotle’s one was free from this constrain. 
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His thinking leads to a naturalistic approach without these drawbacks. 
Thus, his view is very approximate to the scientific teleology used today 
by a biologist. 
According to Lennox (1992), natural theology is a form of the Pla-
tonic tradition of teleology. Some well-known authors, such as William 
Paley (1743-1805) or John Herschel (1792-1871) followed this idea and 
thinking after the Scientific Revolution and during the Enlightenment. 
This movement was according to the widespread belief in the develop-
ment of ever-greater perfection in the world through the exercise of 
God’s laws (Mayr, 1992, p. 372). However, the scientific endeavor broke 
with this tradition, discarding and any theological thinking a priori. The 
second charge teleology received from biologists and philosophers of 
science is that it is principled in a vitalist way.   
Before discussing vitalism, we should define it properly: “The vitalists 
position was that living organisms, unlike artefacts, are subject to the 
influence of vital force, which is independent of the body.” (Morris et al., 
2000, p. 583). The vitalist movement added to an unknown and presum-
ably unknowable, a factor that is usually untestable. Currently, from a 
biological and scientific point of view, vitalism became discredited and 
vanished from the discourse of biologists Thus, rather than postulating 
a mysterious, unknowable vital force, there is a recognition that life is 
inside the realm of the chemical-physical laws (Mayr, 1982, p. 52).  
 We can add Ghiselin’s criticism on teleology: “Vast burden of worth-
less metaphysical baggage.” (Ghiselin, 1997, p. 294). By eliminating the 
“burden of worthless metaphysical baggage” (anthropomorphism, the-
ology, final causes and vitalism), it is possible to get a scientifically valid 
notion of teleology.  It is possible to help biologists to understand and 
explain traits in organisms1, including adaptation. Darwin forged the no-
tion of adaptation in terms of the apparent design of the organism as if 
for a common purpose (Gardner, 2009). Thus, the explanatory frame-
work of Darwin concerns functions as an explanation of adaptations. 
 
1 When we place teleology within the tenets of science, we are aligned with the three 
main bases of successful modern biology as considered by Williams (1992): mechanism, 
natural selection, and historicity. Thus, mechanism states that every vital function is per-
formed from systems that possess a causal net that can be explained by physical and 
chemical factors (as opposed by vitalism); and the assumption that the Darwinian pro-
cess of natural selection accounts for all explanatory framework for the existence of ad-
aptation in an organism (as opposed to rational plan or to the ideas of Lamarck). 
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I intend to show how these vitalistic ideas were harmful for the tele-
ological notion in biology as some philosophers of science, mainly the 
positivists, claim. The founding figures of the Vienna Circle, in the Man-
ifesto, presented biology as a science with metaphysical problems (Mach 
[1929], 1996). The authors identified the presence of vitalistic thinking, 
and they rejected it as a metaphysical thesis. They insisted on the univer-
sal validity of the explanatory model in physics. They considered physics 
as a mature science and an example for all other sciences. As argued, the 
problem with vitalism sounded genuine, and for a long time, biology was 
considered an immature science by most of these philosophers, but I can 
mention other reasons, for instance, its inherently historical nature.  
Salmon (1989) mentioned that the presence of the vitalist doctrine in 
biology motivated Carl G. Hempel and Ernest Nagel to study the teleo-
logical/functional explanation. Nagel (1961) argued that teleological ex-
planations in biology could always be reformulated in non-teleological 
terms without the loss of content. Therefore, he was advocating the ex-
clusion of this term from the sciences. Furthermore, Nagel (1961), 
alongside Hempel (1965), worked on what they have called the problem 
of functional equivalence in biology in terms of the deductive-nomolog-
ical (DN) model of scientific explanation. We can understand functional 
equivalence as distinct traits that have the same function. These prob-
lems were aligned with the idea that functional explanations do not fit 
any pattern of scientific explanation, including the inductive or statistical 
ones (Salmon, 1989). This problem was exposed by Salmon:  
When we identify some item as fulfilling a function, we recognize that it 
is sufficient to produce some result in a certain situation. But usually we 
cannot claim that it is the only possible device that would fulfill that 
function. It is not necessary for the realization of the goal. (Salmon, 
1989, p. 30) 
Thus, in biology, mainly evolutionary biology, we have numerous ex-
amples that fulfil this line of reasoning. As a straightforward example, 
take the adaptations of Arctic and Antarctic mammals and birds to the 
challenges of polar life. The animals can regulate their body temperature 
by growing a winter plumage (birds – except penguins) and coat of fur 
(mammals), or by relying on a layer of blubber to prevent heat (pen-
guins). Each of these strategies have the function to protect from the 
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cold, so they are functionally equivalent, and mainly, no law could follow 
it deductively. 
Hempel concluded his discussion of functional analysis in the follow-
ing terms:  
It remains true, therefore, even for a properly relativized version of func-
tional analysis, that its explanatory force is rather limited; in particular, it 
does not provide an explanation of why a particular item i rather than 
some functional equivalent of it occurs in systems. (Hempel, 1965, p. 
324) 
Thus, for Hempel, functional analysis cannot qualify as a permissible 
type of explanation, but at best, it has heuristic value. So it is because the 
explanandum gives the necessary conditions for the explanans. In the 
deductive nomological model, the explanans must be logically sufficient 
for the explanandum (DiFrisco, 2017, p. 2). However, as we saw, this 
mode of thought fails to recognize the causal factors; as showed by fa-
mous counterexamples to Hempel’s deductive-nomological account of 
explanation. Functional explanations are therefore, appropriate and nec-
essary, as well as scientific; and any philosophical model of scientific ba-
sis which cannot accommodate functional analysis is inadequate 
(Salmon, 1992, p. 28-32). Henceforth functional analyses2 and teleology 
can be considered a legitimate pursuit in philosophy and biology (see for 
instance: Brandon, 1990; Ayala, 2016; Neander, 1991; Cummins, 2002; 
Ruse, 1989; Gardner, 2009; Garson, 2019). 
2  DARWIN, TELEOLOGY AND ADAPTATION - A 
FRUITFUL UNION 
As shown, the teleological thinking was in bad shape in the early 19th 
century. There were two options: (1) a theological approach which in-
volved a supernatural explanation style; (2) a vitalist explanation, as an 
untestable metaphysical discipline.   However, all of this had changed 
when Charles Darwin published his book, Origin of Species (1859), in it, 
he laid down the fundamentals of the evolutionary thought by natural 
selection, as being a goal-directed, teleological force.  
 
2 Functional analysis is the operational way that we can study teleology scientifically; 
biological functions, thus, can generate genuine teleological explanations. 
 
 66
Lennox (2013, p. 136) cited a passage of Darwin presenting a teleo-
logical form. Darwin, as showed by Lennox, was explicitly accounting 
for adaptations as consequence of chance variation and natural selection.  
In that way, we can see the use of selection-based (teleological) explana-
tion, that it is unlike any of the forms of teleology available to him at that 
time as discussed. Ayala wrote: 
Darwin accepted the facts of adaptation, and then provided a natural 
explanation for the facts. One of his greatest accomplishments was to 
bring the teleological aspects of nature into the realm of science. [He 
substituted a theological view by a scientific teleological one]. The tele-
ology of nature could now be explained, at least in principle, as the result 
of natural laws manifested in natural processes, without recourse to an 
external Creator or to spiritual or nonmaterial forces. At that point biol-
ogy came to maturity as a science. (Ayala, 2016, p. 121) 
When Darwin “re-invented” teleology (Lennox, 1993), he opened a 
new road for the scientific problem related to functions in biology. Be-
cause Darwin considered an explanation of adaptation as the chief re-
quirement of evolutionary theory (Gould, 2002), adaptation became an 
important matter from that day after (mainly for the architects of the 
Neo-Darwinian program).  
Before going further, we need to answer what, precisely, is an adap-
tation? The term “adaptation” derives from ad + Optus, that is, the pro-
cess by which populations of organisms evolve in such a way as to be-
come better suited to their environments as advantageous traits become 
predominant driven by natural selection. In other words, the study of 
adaptation aims to understand the fit between organismal form and 
function across the living world (Brandon, 1990). So, as Kim Sterenly 
(1996) argues, the reasoning to detect an adaptation is the same as a 
functional rationale. 
According to Stephen Jay Gould, the problem of adaptation is “trans-
forming environmental (external) information into internal changes of 
form, physiology and behavior.” (Gould, 2002, p. 157). Thus, adaptation 
is for Darwin the primary subject for practical study of evolutionary 
mechanisms. In Darwin’s words:    
Over all these causes of Change I am convinced that the accumulative 
action of Selection, whether applied methodically and more quickly, or 
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unconsciously and more slowly, but more efficiently, is by far the pre-
dominant Power. (Darwin, 1859, p. 43) 
Although natural selection was the most important evolutionary 
mechanism for Darwin, this was not the only process, as the following 
quote shows us: “I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the 
main but not exclusive means of modification.” (Darwin, 1859, p. 6).  
As Darwin wrote, we need to be aware that there are other processes 
that can generate diversity and modification, which are unrelated do nat-
ural selection3. Closely related to Darwin’s quotation, there is a widely 
famous case of methodological uniformity, that became known as the 
“adaptationist programme” by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard 
Lewontin (1979). They argued that the only hypothesis being considered 
by some authors in their studies of the evolution of traits is an adapta-
tional one, by that, excluding any other hypothesis (e.g., developmental 
constraint). However, before exposing in details the points of this oft-
cited and influential paper, I will show that, as argued by Dennett (1995), 
the paper of Gould & Lewontin is a “massively misread classic”. Many 
scientists thought of the paper written by Gould & Lewontin (1979) as 
a refutation of adaptationism; or even as a criticism of teleology. But this 
is in error. For example, Michael Heads (2009) and Philippe Grandcolas 
(2015) regarded the argumentation of Gould & Lewontin (1979) as a 
criticism of teleology; however, a close read can show us that it is not 
the case. Instead, if Heads (2009) and Grandcolas (2015) criticized the 
erratic notion of “preadaptation”, that would be correct. For instance, 
feathers can be “preadaptations” for flight; however, this suggested ter-
minology is very misleading as it treats evolution in a forward-looking 
process, anticipating the future needs of the organism (which is clearly a 
misguided approach and reasoning). This was the reason why Gould and 
Elisabeth Vrba (1982) proposed the concept of exaptation – characters 
that evolved for other usages (or for no function at all) and posteriorly 
merged with other characters in order to reach their current function.  
 
3 However, we should be very careful in stating this “pluralism”. Mayr (1983), in a re-
sponse to Gould & Lewontin, said that nobody nowadays use the same “plurarism” as 
Darwin, because he accepted alternatives to natural selection, as the effects of use and 
disuse and the direct action of external conditions on organisms, that were completely 
discarded as options by the architects of the modern synthesis. 
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However, before exposing the points of this oft-cited and influential 
paper, I will show that, as stated by Dennett (1995), the article by Gould 
& Lewontin (1979) is a “massively misread classic”. It is considered a 
refutation of adaptationism or even as a criticism of teleology. But this 
is in error.  Michael Heads (2009) and Grandcolas (2015) regarded the 
argumentation of Gould & Lewontin (1979) as a criticism of teleology; 
however, a close read can show us that it is not the case. Instead, if Heads 
(2009) and Grandcolas (2015) criticized the erratic notion of “preadap-
tation”, that would be correct. For instance, feathers can be “preadapta-
tions” for flight; however, this suggested terminology is very misleading 
as it treats evolution in a forward-looking process, anticipating the future 
needs of the organism (which is a misguided approach and reasoning). 
Thus, Gould & Vrba (1982) proposed the concept of exaptation – char-
acters that evolved for other usages (or for no function at all) and pos-
teriorly merged with other characters to reach their current function.  
3 TELEOLOGY AND ADAPTATION: THE “HARDENED” 
MODERN SYNTHESIS AND THE CENTRALITY OF 
ADAPTATION 
The Modern Synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s is a well know theo-
retical and epistemological union in evolutionary biology, is considered 
a canonical example of a paradigm shift – a unification of research 
groups – in biology (Futuyma, 2005; Gould, 2002; Pigliucci & Müller, 
2010). For the sake of brevity, I will simply provide the highlights of 
these ideas (for a detailed historical analysis, see Mayr & Provine, 1980).  
Julian Huxley (1887-1975) proposed the name of this movement 
1942. He settled the conceptual structure underlying evolutionary biol-
ogy and tried to capture and synthesize the knowledge on this subject. 
As Futuyma (2005) summarized, their program hold:  
(a) that genetic variation in phenotypic characters arises by random mu-
tation and recombination; (b) that changes in the proportions of alleles 
and genotypes within a population may result in replacement of geno-
types over generations; (c) that such changes in the proportions of gen-
otypes may occur either by random fluctuations (genetic drift) or by 
nonrandom, consistent differences among genotypes in survival or re-
production rates (natural selection); and (d) that due to different histo-
ries of genetic drift and natural selection, populations of a species may 
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diverge and become reproductively isolated species. (Futuyma, 2005, p. 
14) 
These are the principal claims of the evolutionary synthesis, and even 
though these principles, clarified, or modified or extended since then, 
constituting the foundations of modern evolutionary biology. But these 
extensions and modifications became so substantial that, recently, some 
authors set out a new evolutionary biology plan, known as the Extended 
Synthesis. Their agenda accounts for particular fields of inquiry, such as 
Evo-Devo and phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard, 2003). This move-
ment had their synthetic book as well, the Pigliucci & Müller’s (2010) 
Evolution - the extended synthesis. This program presents five main goals 
(Pigliucci & Müller 2010): (1) to emphasize the importance of the devel-
opmental biology; (2) to provide a “holistic” view of species (as a criti-
cism of molecular biology); (3) to incorporate and give more explanatory 
importance of phenotypic plasticity, genetic accommodation, epigenetic 
inheritance as contributing factors to phenotypic diversity; (4) to include 
elements from computational biology and (5) to incorporate insights 
from evolvability, modularity and robustness. So they propose the addi-
tion of some features, the redefinition of others from the old principles 
of the Modern Synthesis, taking into account the results of the most re-
cent research conducted in the various fields in biology.  
Gould (2002) argued that the process of synthesizing had two main 
phases. The first one was the integration of Mendel and Darwin to the 
discipline of population genetics. This integration explains all life forms 
on Earth. Besides that, dismisses essentialism, the inheritance of ac-
quired characters, orthogenetic trends, and saltationism (Mayr, 1982, p. 
131). The second is the phase of “hardening” that reached to orthodoxy 
by maintaining that adaptation is an option to be ascertained to an a priori 
“assumption of near-ubiquity”. After the establishment of the adapta-
tionist program, prevailed the idea that the power of natural selection, as 
an optimizing agent, is executed through the conceptual breakdown of 
organisms into unitary characters, proposing an evolutionary explana-
tion for each of them. 
The direct production of adaptation through its operation becomes 
the primary cause of almost organic traits. Pleiotropy and phenotypic 
plasticity occur scarcely. (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). The influence of 
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other processes such as genetic drift, genetic constraints is low. Conse-
quentely, they should be dropped from the discussion. To make one ex-
ample, consider the persistence of basic structural similarities across dif-
ferent taxa, as the neck skeletons of giraffe, man, and mouse. Even hav-
ing very different ways of life, they all present seven cervical vertebrae 
(Williams, 1992, p. 7). This striking persistence can be explained histori-
cally (descent from a common ancestor) not by natural selection (that 
explains adaptation and diversity) but by this constraint. Thus, stabilizing 
selection should be called to make this explanation coherent (Sterenly & 
Griffths, 1999, p. 227). 
Arguing for the circularity in the adaptationist program, adaptive sto-
ries would be very to confirm, but very hard to falsify (Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979), and this is a hallmark of poor scientific hypotheses. 
The epistemological role is very plain: adaptationists regard the simple 
presence of a trait as a confirmation that it is an adaptation shaped by 
natural selection. The under-appreciation of other factors as being rele-
vant for the modifications on an organism was one of the results of the 
simplistic idea of selection acting more or less directly on genes (Pigliucci 
& Kaplan, 2000) – different genes for each aspect of the organism which 
can be separately molded by natural selection (one-gene one-trait approach) 
– was a serious issue at that time. In their same work, Gould & Lewontin 
(1979) describe some “common styles of argument” by the adaptation-
ists:  
The failure of one adaptive explanation should always simply inspire a 
search for another of the same general form, rather than a consideration 
of alternatives to the proposition that each part is ‘for’ some specific 
purpose. (Gould & Lewontin 1979, p. 589) 
Therefore, after this work, considered the “final proclamation of 
death” (Rose & Lauder, 1996) of the adaptationist program, or orthodox 
Darwinism (Dennett, 1995), as known and endorsed by the architects of 
the Modern Synthesis, come to an end.  In Gould’s words:  
Lewontin and I… would later call ‘just-so stories’ or plausible claims 
without tested evidence, whereas other prominent trends could not even 
generate a plausible story in adaptationist terms at all. (Gould, 2002, p. 
39)  
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Thus, this would be an adaptationist scenario to confirm the pro-
posed narrative of the adaptation of a particular trait. However, this way 
of thought sometimes was so ample to include the origins of any kind of 
trait (Smith, 2016). 
 For one side, the “Panglossian Paradigm” was right in its criticism. 
It forced the evolutionary biologists to be more cautious with their evi-
dence and their form of confirmation; it constituted a bona fide example 
of confirmation bias. Those criticisms contributed to provide more co-
herency to evolution and biology. Any theory which intends to deliver a 
fully-fledged narrative history (teleological or adaptationist) must be con-
sistent with the tenets of modern science. Therefore, if the hypotheses 
of adaptation are unfalsifiable and do not possess an (explicitly) non-
circular criterion of acceptability, this approach is not a strong scientific 
endeavor. By incorporating those relevant data, it is possible, then, to 
support or disconfirm a hypothesis of adaptation 
We should see the efforts made by Gould and Lewontin to approxi-
mate one main branch of evolutionary research within a scientific rigor 
necessary for any serious field. They introduced some ontological prob-
lems to be dealt with by those scientists. They are the existence of plei-
otropy, epistasis and developmental constraints, which connect up the 
expression of genetic variation among loci in nonlinear ways (Pigliucci 
& Kaplan, 2000). And finally, they gave some alternative hypotheses to 
be considered when discussing the explanation of a trait, like an expla-
nation considering no adaptation and no selection or selection without 
adaptation.  
Pigliucci and Kaplan wrote: “It is this synthesis of constraints (span-
drelism) and selection (panglossianism) that is the key to a more sober 
and realistic understanding of phenotypic evolution.” (Pigliucci & 
Kaplan, 2000, p. 67). Afterwards, even committed adaptationists began 
to recognize these criticisms, as their discussion and claims of adaptation 
were much more cautioned (Amundson, 1996). Consequently, the prob-
lem that we are trying to explain, the apparent design of organisms as a 
result of adaptation (Gardner, 2009), could be adequately answered. 
So far, so good. However, one of the side effects of being one of the 
most influential and cited articles in evolutionary biology is that various 
authors have caricatured, misunderstood and even failed to appreciate 
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their views properly. What happened next can be exemplified by the fol-
lowing quotation: 
This paper [Gould & Lewontin, (1979)] had such a substantial impact 
on the fashions of evolutionary biology that the very term ‘adaptation-
ism’ and sometimes even ‘adaptation’ itself, became pejorative. To a sig-
nificant extent, the term adaptation was banished from the lexicon of 
evolutionary biology, for fear of being associated with the dread adapta-
tionism. (Rose & Lauder, 1996, p. 2) 
It is plain to see that the criticism by Gould and Lewontin even 
though is correct, lead some authors to abandon the pursuit of adapta-
tions. Accordingly, Dennett argues that some hypotheses of adaptation 
were, indeed, handled by excess by some authors and deserves criticism, 
but we need caution because while: 
Adaptationist reasoning is not optional; it is the heart and soul of evolu-
tionary biology. Although it may be supplemented, and its flaws re-
paired, to think of displacing it from central position in biology is to 
imagine not just the downfall of Darwinism but the collapse of modern 
biochemistry and all the life sciences and medicine. (Dennett, 1995, p. 
238) 
Gans (1988), argued for the lack of rigor of some authors in adaptive 
explanations, such as why the “buffalo eat grass”. He considered that the 
responses “buffalo are adapted to eat grass” or “buffalo evolved to eat 
grass”, do not explain. There is no answer to “why-question”.  To pre-
sent this case is to give a narrative explanation. The methodological error 
that the adaptationists make can be pointed by the following quote made 
by Mayr (1983) when he asks: “What is the function of a given structure 
or organ?” in this way, he already assumes adaptation; we just have to 
make discovery it. However, when we ask, “Does this trait have a func-
tion?” there is no assumption, a priori, that the trait is an adaptation 
(Lloyd, 2015). Thus, we should start our determination of the evolution 
of any trait by asking whether it is causally related to a particular function, 
only afterwards we can give any proposition of its adaptiveness. 
In this way, he already assumes adaptation; we just have to make dis-
covery it. However, when we ask, “Does this trait have a function?” 
there is no assumption, a priori, that the trait is an adaptation (Lloyd, 
2015). Thus, we should start our determination of the evolution of any 
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trait by asking whether it is causally related to a particular function, only 
afterwards we can give any proposition of its adaptiveness 
In the next twenty years, after the fall of the naive adaptationism, we 
met the “post-spandrel adaptationism” or “the new adaptationism” 
(Rose & Lauder, 1996). It inaugurated a new schedule for adaptations, 
selection and historicity (narrative explanations). This movement is also 
known as the “Adaptive-historical thinking” (Griffiths 1996), because he 
identified, alongside Rose & Lauder (1996), a historical turn, with its new 
tools and more robust methodologies, incorporated in the studies of ad-
aptation.  
Within this scenario, Rose & Lauder (1996) proposed new assump-
tions that for being considered in the analysis that evolutionary biologists 
must make pursuit in the study of selection and adaptation: (1) the use 
of phylogenies in the comparative method. It provides the critical eval-
uation and questions about the nature of homology and looks rigorously 
at morphological data of all sorts. (2) the use of population biology 
through the development of methodologies based on quantitative genet-
ics theory that involves selective manipulation that can replicate extant 
differences among populations; and (3) the rigor of functional morphol-
ogy and biomechanics (as disciplines whose goal is the analysis of bio-
logical design and teleology). Adaptational studies by correcting some 
methodological mistakes (“just-so stories” and the adaptationist pro-
gram) and introducing new ones (the new adaptationism) got a refresh-
ment. They can, finally, present unbiased and well-confirmed hypothesis.  
The difficulty in proposing a strong hypothesis of adaptation will al-
ways be present. Historical hypotheses are tough to grasp because mor-
phology, environment, can change as time goes by. Despite these diffi-
culties, the pursuit of adaptation, the core of evolutionary biology, is very 
legitime. The fact that evolutionary processes are not easily testable is 
not an epistemological excuse to give up the research it all together. Mak-
ing science is not an easy task. 
Using these criteria, scientists can formulate scientifically testable and 
non-speculative argumentation in favor of adaptation. In the next sec-





4  FINAL REMARKS 
Stoddard et al. (2017) proposed an “adaptative explanation” for the 
size of the eggs. They considered the asymmetry and ellipticity in various 
avian clades. They have found that these forms, when correlated with 
biometric, life history, and environmental parameters, show that egg size 
is regulated and causally linked by life history characteristics and spatial 
constraints in the nest. Hence, the form is functionally related to adap-
tations for flight (as a key driver). They further proposed that the “gen-
eral adaptations for strong flight select for a constrained, muscular, 
streamlined body plan in both males and females, giving rise in the latter, 
directly or indirectly, to asymmetric and or elliptical eggs.” (Stoddard et 
al. 2017, p. 1253) So, it is plain to see that when they gave a functional 
explanation, they achieved the evolutionary (adaptationist) explanation.  
In this example, we can see that they are explaining a trait, the egg 
shape, by the ends, or function – in this case, selection for a strong flight 
– thus, we are describing something that is forward in time relative to 
the thing explained. This is what a teleological explanation means. There-
fore, in biology, especially evolutionary biology, this language is com-
monplace and correct. It is obvious how teleology (with its forward-
looking approach) is essential for evolutionary biology; being one of the 
main reasons it distinguishes itself from the physical sciences (Ruse, 
1989).  
As a canonical example, the motion of the Earth around the Sun re-
sults from the laws of gravity, and this is the result of laws of nature; it 
does not exist to satisfy certain ends or goals. Teleological explanations, 
unlike nonteleological ones, make a distinctive talk of a means-to-an-end 
relationship of the process. This characteristic is one of the primary dis-
tinction of biology as a natural science (Ayala, 2016). 
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